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TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SCIENCE FANTASY 259 
Carl D. Malmgren 
Towards a Definition of Science Fantasy 
Without faith that nature is subject of law, there can be no science. 
Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings 
But I was leading up to the subject of 'natural aw.' Is not the invariability of 
natural aw an unproved assumption? Even on Earth? 
Robert Heinlein, Glory Road 
The poet should prefer probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities. 
Aristotle, The Poetics 
To discover a point of intersection between fantasy and SF,1 we might do 
well to begin first with fictional worlds in general and then turn to SF in 
particular, in part because the latter is a narrative genre rather orderly and 
susceptible of definition. A fictional universe necessarily consists of two 
major components or systems, roughly equivalent to the lexicon and syntax 
of a language-a world and a story. The former includes the total repertoire 
of possible fictional entities-i.e., the characters, settings and objects (in 
SF these would include gadgets, inventions, discoveries, and so forth) that 
occupy the fictional domain. The story connects and combines the various 
entities that make up the world; at an abstract level it consists of a system- 
atic set of rules governing the arrangement and interaction of those entities. 
Now the generic distinctiveness of SF lies not in its story but in its world. 
The various plots of SF, once divested of their alien, otherworldly, or futur- 
istic appurtenances, tend to coincide with the plots of realistic fiction.2 In 
order to understand the nature of SF and its cognitive possibilities, we must 
examine the unique configuration of its worlds. When discussing a fictional 
world, to avoid the implicit assumptions that the characters are human and 
the settings terran, I shall use the terms actants and topoi; a world consists 
of a number of actants who populate, occupy, or exist in certain implicit or 
expressly particularized topoi. 
The next step in our definition involves establishing a standard with 
which to compare the object of inquiry. In this respect, Lubomir Dolezel 
offers the following suggestion: "The study of possible narrative worlds 
will be facilitated, if we can define a basic narrative world to which all oth- 
ers will be related as its alternatives. It seems natural to propose for this 
role the narrative world which corresponds to our actual, empirical world" 
(pp. 9-10). As regards SF, Darko Suvin specifies that the basic narrative 
world corresponds to "the 'zero world' of empirically verifiable properties 
around the author" (p. 1 1; emphasis added). It happens in SF that narrative 
motifs or entities which, at the time of their inscription, represent a depar- 
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ture from the author's empirical environment become actualized in a later 
empirical environment (e.g., submarines, space flight, atomic energy). 
Returning to our definition, then, we can say that the distinctiveness of SF 
rests in its generic license to situate itself in worlds other than the basic 
narrative world.3 This license identifies SF as a narrative subgenre of 
Romance (recall that Wells referred to his early fictions as "scientific 
romances"). Any SF world necessarily contains a "representational discon- 
tinuity" (Scholes: 62), a factor of disjunction from the basic narrative world 
created by an actantial or topological transformation. One of the advantages 
that accrues to this type of narrative ontology has to do with the imagina- 
tive latitude granted the author. The author who inscribes an SF world is 
cut loose from some of the exigencies of mimesis; he or she is free to spec- 
ulate, to fabulate, to invent. But the conventions of SF do not grant total 
license to the fictionist. Once the author has posited the representational 
discontinuity (and there may be more than one such factor), the conven- 
tions of the genre dictate that the author thereafter adhere to the laws of 
nature and the laws inherent in the scientific method; SF does not violate 
notions of possibility, cause and effect, irreversibility, verifiability, and the 
continuity of space and time. SF thus embeds its novum (Suvin: 3), or fac- 
tor of discontinuity, within a discourse informed by the assumptions of a 
scientific epistemology; the actants or topoi may be alien, but the discourse 
insists that they are subject to scientific explanation. Given these features, 
SF can indeed be said to possess a "deep structure that unites in some way 
scientific necessity and imaginative freedom" (Huntington: 161). In fact, 
this counterpoise between creative latitude and scientific necessity in part 
distinguishes pure SF from pure fantasy. The worlds of the latter are under 
no obligation to be faithful to a scientific epistemology; in such worlds, 
various forms of magic can govern the relations between human and natu- 
ral realms, and all sorts of fantastic or impossible actants might flourish, 
without any scientific motivation or rationale. 
If there is a critical consensus about the nature of fantasy, it is that 
fantasy in some way violates the conventional norms of possibility.4 As one 
critic says, fantasy writers "take as their point of departure the deliberate 
violation of norms and facts we regard as essential to our conventional con- 
ception of 'reality,' in order to create an imaginary counter-structure or 
counter-norm" (Fredericks: 37). It should be stressed that this contravention 
of possibility is deliberate and conscious; fantasy is informed by an attitude 
that "admits fabulous and supernatural beings (other than God) have no 
objective existence while at the same time insisting that art has the right to 
invoke and describe such beings" (Petzold: 16). SF, on the other hand, 
because it accepts the dictates of scientific necessity, attempts to make its 
worlds conform to the norms of scientific possibility. As Mark Rose has 
noted, "by invoking the scientific ethos to assert the possibility of the fic- 
tional worlds it describes, science fiction differentiates itself from fantasy" 
(p. 20). 
These two narrative forms, SF and fantasy, do have a locus of intersec- 
tion, which we will term science fantasy, an unstable hybrid form combining 
features from each subgenre.5 As argued above, an SF world introduces a 
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factor (or factors) of discontinuity or estrangement into its system of actants 
and topoi, but once that factor is posited, the world does not violate natural 
laws or a scientific epistemology. A fantasy world, on the other hand, is 
free to contravene both natural aws and the scientific epistemology in cre- 
ating and concatenating its actants and its topoi. A fantasy world is distin- 
guished by a "full 180-degree reversal of a ground rule" (Rabkin: 91), a 
contravention of the conventional norms of possibility; the discourse of 
fantasy never naturalizes its fantasy elements and oftentimes paradoxically 
affirms both their existence and their impossibility. The introduction of a 
fantasy actant (like a ghost, witch, demon, sorcerer, ghoul, or dragon) signals 
the fact that in that world the laws of physical science have been suspended. 
A science-fantasy world, then, would be one in which the actants or topoi 
presuppose at least one deliberate and obvious contravention of natural aw 
or empirical fact, but which provides a scientific rationale for the contra- 
vention and explicitly grounds its discourse in the scientific method and 
scientific necessity. Science fantasy, like SF, assumes "an orderly universe 
with regular and discernible laws" (Allen: 7), but like fantasy, it contains at 
least one violation of the laws that we derive from the current state of sci- 
ence. A science-fantasy world has all of the predicates that we associate 
with S-F worlds-logical consistency, predictability, regularity, account- 
ability, comprehensibility. In such a world, an organized or "scientific" 
explanation can be formulated for whatever happens. The source, validity, 
cogency, or plausibility of that explanation is not at issue; indeed, frequently 
the explanation draws on questionable analogies, imaginary science, far- 
fetched gadgets, or counterfactual postulates. Even so, the science fantasy 
is rooted in a discourse which takes for granted the validity of the scientific 
episteme and which therefore provides a quasi-scientific rationale for its 
reversals of natural aw. As a matter of fact, the scientific discourse of sci- 
ence fantasy serves to validate the counterscientific element, convincing us 
of its plausibility. The "science" in science fantasy represents "an attempt 
to legitimize situations that depend on fantastic assertions" (Waggoner: 19). 
In order to elaborate on the discourse of science fantasy, I would like to 
look in some detail at two science-fantasy "meta-texts," texts which inter- 
rogate the boundaries of the genre; namely, Fritz Leiber's Conjure Wife 
(1953) and Stanislaw Lem's The Investigation (1959; English translation, 
1974). Leiber's novel is of interest to this essay just because it thematizes 
the contradiction inherent between science and magic as ways of under- 
standing and dealing with the human condition; that is, it incorporates the 
tension and conflict between the two into both its story and its discourse. 
The hero, Norman Sayler, is a sociology professor at a small, exclusive, 
snobbish New England college. His field of study is ethnology, and he has 
specialized in feminine psychology in relation to magic and the parallels 
between primitive superstition and modern neuroses. In other words, his 
life's work has been to document the extent to which primitive customs and 
beliefs survive and to put them into an explanatory scientific framework. 
He firmly believes in "the systematic use of the scientific method" (4:35). 
His ordered and orderly universe unravels one day when, snooping 
through his wife's possessions, he discovers that she (Tansy) has herself 
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been practicing conjure magic. When confronted, she admits that she has 
been using spells and charms, but only to protect him and advance his 
career. In one "session" that lasts an entire evening, Norman convinces his 
wife that she must repudiate entirely these superstitious beliefs and prac- 
tices, and together they bum all her charms and totems. Not surprisingly, in 
the next few days Norman suffers a series of minor and major disasters and 
reversals. A former student who feels that Norman was responsible for his 
dismissal from school makes a pathetic attempt on Norman's life; a sexually 
frustrated coed accuses him of having seduced her; a colleague discovers 
an obscure manuscript which seems to have anticipated Norman's own 
scholarship, thus implicating him in an act of plagiarism; the college offers 
the departmental chair to an inept colleague; even in his private life Norman 
falls prey to a number of accidents and mishaps. Naturally he is tempted to 
connect these setbacks with the destruction of his wife's protective charms, 
but he rejects the possibility out of hand, because that way lies madness: 
"Thoughts are dangerous, he told himself, and thoughts against all science, 
all sanity, all civilized intelligence, are the most dangerous of all" (10:96). 
His personal and professional fortunes continue to deteriorate, and he 
begins to entertain the notion that all women are to some degree and with 
varying aptitudes practicing witches: 
Why not carry it a step further? Maybe all women were the same. Guardians 
of mankind's ancient customs and traditions, including the practice of witch- 
craft. Fighting their husbands' battles from behind the scenes, by sorcery. 
Keeping it a secret; and on those occasions when they were discovered, conven- 
iently explaining it as feminine susceptibility to superstitious fads. 
Half the human race still actively practicing sorcery. 
Why not? (6:66) 
He discovers, moreover, that three women in particular, wives of influential 
colleagues, are conspiring to sabotage his career and destroy him and his 
wife. But he categorically refuses to admit that he is dealing with real witch- 
craft, instead attributing the aberrant behavior to the neuroses and hysteria 
of suggestible women. 
The conflict between the parties escalates, until Norman is thrown into 
a situation where he is quite literally battling this diabolical trio for the pos- 
session of his wife's soul. His wife leaves him the instructions for a coun- 
terspell, but he is reluctant to carry them out-to do so is "to compromise 
with magic" (12:120). Even at the crucial moments, as the clock moves on 
towards midnight, he hesitates: "But to tackle it in dead seriousness, to 
open your mind to superstition-that was to join hands with the forces 
pushing the world back to the dark ages, to cancel the term 'science' out of 
the equation" (14:132). At the last moment he goes ahead with the counter- 
spell, arguing to himself that he must do everything to save his wife, in 
order to keep faith with a loved one. As he struggles to put the spell together, 
he comes to a startling realization: 
Then, in one instant of diabolic paralyzing insight, he knew that this was sor- 
cery. No mere puttering about with ridiculous medieval implements, no effort- 
less sleight of hand, but a straining, back-breaking struggle to keep control of 
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forces summoned, of which the objects he manipulated were only the symbols.... 
He could not believe it. He did not believe it. Yet somehow he had to believe 
it. (14:134) 
In the denouement that follows, Norman not only devotes himself to 
the mastery of sorcery (eventually defeating his adversaries with their own 
weapons); he even begins to put the discipline on a scientific footing. By 
theorizing and rationalizing magic, he turns it into a kind of bastardized sci- 
ence, for which "the basic formulas and the master-formulas have never 
been discovered" (16:158). Indeed, a mathematical analysis of the symbolic 
logic of a number of spells gives him the master formula with which he 
defeats his enemies. In other words, the scientific method produces the 
equivalent of super-magic. All the while Norman tries to convince himself 
that he is acting out an elaborate charade for his wife: 
What strangeness pressing on the heels of strangeness it was, Norman 
thought dreamily, not only to pretend to believe in black magic in order to 
overawe three superstitious, psychotic women who had a hold on his wife's 
mental life, but even to invoke the modem science of symbolic logic in the 
service of that pretended belief. (18:173) 
And yet in the next moment he admits to himself that these are "stuffy 
rationalizations" (18:174), that his wife's soul has indeed been stolen. 
In terms of our own discussion of science fantasy as a genre, we can 
say that Conjure Wife plainly draws on actants and forces and motifs that 
we associate with traditional fantasy; that, like the protagonist, the reader is 
"wrench[ed]...away from rationality" (20:196) in a short period of time. 
Leiber does turn the novel in the direction of science fantasy by naturalizing 
magic in the final chapters, more specifically by converting it into a "soft" 
science (like psychology, according to Tansy).6 The scientific paradigm is 
modified so as to make room for magic. In this way Leiber draws attention 
to the compulsive need of the scientific mentality to domesticate or master 
the most anomalous phenomena. 
The work thus foregrounds and interrogates the scientific episteme in 
general. As will be seen, this kind of interrogation constitutes science fanta- 
sy's central theme. The scientific explanation of magic is based on analogy 
and is not particularly convincing, but by dramatizing the tension between 
magic and science and by inserting magic into a naturalizing discourse, 
Leiber has created a science-fantasy novel. 
It is instructive to pair Conjure Wife with another novel which explores 
the tensions between scientific and unscientific explanations for supernatu- 
ral phenomena, but which avoids any reference to occultism or magic: 
Lem's The Investigation. Like Conjure Wife, The Investigation interrogates 
the very terms of its narrative identity, exploring the limits of the scientific 
method in the face of an inexplicable universe; its focal point is "what its 
title announces it to be: not...the phenomena being investigated, but the 
process of investigation itself' (Philmus: 196). Moreover, as George Guffey 
points out, in the novel Lem takes on both 19th- and 20th-century scientific 
paradigms, both Newtonian and quantum physics, both inductive/deductive 
reasoning and statistical analysis. 
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When dead bodies begin to disappear from various morgues in England, 
apparently of their own volition-a series of resurrections, as it were- 
Scotland Yard, in the person of the untried Lieutenant Gregory, is called in 
to investigate. He is assisted in the investigation by the brilliant but eccen- 
tric statistician Dr Sciss. Although their approaches are radically different, 
both men share a faith in the inviolability of "facts" and in the ability of 
reason to explain the apparently inexplicable. Gregory is looking for a human 
perpetrator of the body-snatchings; Sciss is looking for some mathematical 
correlation between the disappearances and the circumstances urrounding 
them, because between any two phenomena "there is always a definite cor- 
relation, a valid basis for a discussion of causes and effects" (1:22). Indeed, 
Sciss discovers a mathematical pattern, a regularity, to the incidents of 
"resurrection," one involving factors of time, space, and temperature: that 
is, the product of the distance and the time between consecutive incidents, 
multiplied by the temperature differential, is a constant. The implications of 
Sciss's findings are summarized as follows by Gregory's boss, Chief 
Inspector Sheppard: "[T]he pattern that emerges from our series of incidents 
is impersonal. Impersonal, like a natural aw of some kind....The mathemat- 
ical perfection of this series suggests that there is no culprit" (2:43). Gregory 
recoils instinctively from this reasoning, insisting that there must be a 
human agent behind the episodes. 
But Gregory admits that the case is peculiar, paradoxical. At face value 
the disappearances eem to be the work of a psychopath, a maniac, but this 
hypothesis is contradicted by the planning and methodicality of the alleged 
perpetrator. "Nothing very good. Nothing very good at all," he complains. "A 
series of acts without a single slipup, that's pretty bad....In fact it appalls me, 
it's absolutely inhuman" (2:39). And the mystery of the case is compounded 
by the fact that there seems to be absolutely no motive. The criminal has 
simply gone out of his way "to make it look like the bodies had come back to 
life" (2:44, 47). In his desperate need to have a human culprit, perhaps a very 
intelligent one, Gregory absurdly focusses his suspicions first on his boss, the 
Chief Inspector, and later on Dr Sciss. In fact, he goes so far as to harass the 
latter, frequently making a fool of himself. Trying to explain his unortho- 
dox methods to his chief, he says, "You're right, sir....I acted like an idiot. 
And I have no excuse at all, except that I absolutely refuse to believe in 
miracles, and nothing is going to make me, even if I go crazy" (5:120). 
In the course of his investigation, Gregory very nearly does lose his 
sanity, plunging deeper and deeper into a world which loses definition and 
clarity, becoming more and more surreal. Everything about his life-his 
colleagues, his landlords, the random people he encounters-begins to 
seem mysterious, enigmatic, unfathomable. He inhabits a Kafkaesque 
world peopled by freaks, dwarves, eccentrics, and the like; at one point he 
confuses his mirror image with that of a suspicious stranger. He gets a 
break in the case when a morgue stakeout urns up another "body-snatching," 
but the constable on patrol is knocked unconscious in a car accident (he 
was apparently running blindly from the scene of the incident), and all the 
evidence on the scene seems to point to a "natural" resurrection. As Gregory 
tells his chief, "The situation is much worse" (4:95). 
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Dr Sciss meanwhile continues his statistical analysis of the incidents 
and comes up with a solution of sorts. First he states his scientific credo: 
Science progresses by discovering the connection between one phenomenon 
and other phenomena, and this is exactly what I succeeded in doing... I was 
assigned to determine the cause of this seemingly abnormal series of phenom- 
ena, and, its uniqueness notwithstanding, to connect it with some other series 
of phenomena that was already familiar.... (4:108) 
For him the "operative causes" are indeed "forces of nature" (4:106). It 
turns out that the region in which the disappearances have occurred hap- 
pens also to have the lowest incidence of death from cancer over the last 20 
years. The implication, as Gregory explains to his chief, is that a mutated 
organism of some sort, perhaps a virus, is responsible for the "miracles": 
The reasoning goes this way: cancer manifests itself in an organism as chaos; 
the organism itself, representing order as it is found in the life processes of a 
living body, is the antithesis of chaos. Under certain conditions, this chaos fac- 
tor-that is, cancer, or more accurately, the cancer virus-is mutated, but it 
remains alive, vegetating in whatever medium is its host....Ultimately it under- 
goes such a complete transformation that it develops entirely new powers; it 
changes from a factor that causes chaos to one that tries to create a new kind 
of order, a.. .posthumous order. In other words, for a specific period of time it 
fights against the chaos represented by death and the decomposition of the 
body that follows death. To do this, the new factor tries to restore the life pro- 
cess in an organism whose body is already dead. (5:122) 
Sciss also offers an alternative explanation, as if in passing: that this order- 
microbe or virus might have been planted by extraterrestrials who are curious 
about the mechanics of the human organism but wisely do not wish to 
interfere with living beings. In this account, the cancer correlation is com- 
plicated, but has to do with the fact that those who are relatively immune to 
the cancer organism are proportionately susceptible to the alien organism.7 
As might be expected, Gregory rejects both solutions out of hand, 
because to accept them would be to repudiate everything he believes in. For 
one thing, solution number one would call in question Christianity, and, by 
extension, Western civilization in general. Suppose, Gregory says, there 
was a similar drop in cancer mortality in the Near East about 2,000 years 
ago, that "there was a series of alleged resurrections then also-you know, 
Lazarus, and...the other one" (5:124). In addition, his profession and his 
sanity rest ultimately on the firm belief that the world he inhabits, while not 
always sane, nonetheless is orderly and therefore subject to systematic 
explanation. As the novelist Black says to Gregory, "It's a matter of faith. 
You believe in a perpetrator because you have to" (6:143). 
When the constable who had witnessed the "resurrection" during the 
morgue stakeout finally regains consciousness and in his final moments 
testifies that there was no human culprit, that the corpse got up of its own 
accord and stumbled drunkenly around, Gregory does approach the limits 
of his sanity. He begins to suspect that "Chaos is the law of Nature" (to 
quote Henry Adams), that the world is a kind of "soup with all kinds of 
things floating around in it, and from time to time some of them get stuck 
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together by chance to make some kind of whole" (7:179). In such a world 
absolutely anything is possible, and "blind chance, the eternal arrangement 
of fortuitous events" (7:180), governs all phenomena. 
Chief Sheppard knows that such speculations are dangerous for "inves- 
tigators," and so he fabricates for Gregory an elaborate and patently 
improbable "out," involving a demented lorry driver driven to irrational 
acts, like coffin-robbing, while working night shifts in the pea soup of the 
English fog. When Gregory asks if that is really how it happened, the chief 
replies in the negative, but adds, "it can become the truth" (7:186). And 
when Gregory wants to know why Sheppard has concocted such a con- 
trived but plausible explanation, the latter's response is just as significant: 
"Well, in the final analysis...well, because I work at Scotland Yard, also" 
(7:187). With a deliberate fiction, he is able to give "a semblance of order 
to this disorder" and to insure that the two of them are not "left crying in 
the wilderness" (7:188). 
It should be clear from the interpretative summary above that Lem is 
quite explicitly interrogating the bases upon which scientific explanations 
of the world rest. He is calling "into question both the mechanistic models 
that science latterly subscribes to and the teleological ones that man tends 
to fall back on when confronted with the inadequacy of a purely mechanis- 
tic scheme of things" (Philmus: 193; see also Guffey: 175). In so doing, he 
finally demystifies science itself, exposing it as a kind of enabling fiction, 
one which makes it possible for us to "do" things with the world while 
blinding us to the strangeness of the suppenwelt we inhabit. But at the same 
time Lem inscribes this interrogation of science in a text which relies on the 
conventions and procedures of the scientific method and which incorporates 
a number of quasi-scientific explanations into its discourse. And because 
the basic ground-situation-the premise that corpses might resurrect hem- 
selves-contravenes some basic natural laws and scientific givens, The 
Investigation can finally be described as a science fantasy. 
To return to the task of definition, then, we can say that science fantasy 
inscribes a counternatural world within a naturalizing and scientific dis- 
course. The forms that this counternaturalness can take are several; in fact, 
we can distinguish a number of science-fantasy types according to the nature 
of the contravention or violation that the author assumes in the creation of 
the fictional world. 
Let us consider first a most problematic case, that of the time-travel 
story, since this case unfolds for us the fuzziness of science fantasy's con- 
tours. A conservative and conventional estimation of the current state of 
scientific knowledge rules that it is impossible to travel through time without 
violating several very basic physical laws. In "The Theory and Practice of 
Time Travel" (1975), Larry Niven spells out just what laws must be sus- 
pended or ignored, including conservation of matter, conservation of energy, 
and laws of motion in general. Since for him time travel is thus "impossible 
on any level" ("Afterword" to The Flight of the Horse, p. 211), Niven refuses 
to write SF that employs time travel as an estrangement device. But Niven 
admits that time travel would be admissible in a fantasy fiction, and he 
employs and foregrounds it in his collection of stories, The Flight of the 
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Horse (1973). In these stories, a time traveller named Svetz from the distant 
future travels into the past to bring back extinct species for a zoo. When he 
is told to bring back a horse, he brings back a unicorn; when he tries to cap- 
ture a wolf, he gets stuck with a werewolf. In other words Svetz travels not 
into the past, but into the never-was, the land of fantasy. Because time travel 
"violates too many of the laws of physics and reason" ("Theory and Prac- 
tice," p. 366), Niven can use it only within a fantasy format, where he says 
that it serves purposes of wish-fulfillment, enabling him to stage, for exam- 
ple, a fight between a human and a dragon. 
Niven's theory and practice suggest that since time travel is impossible, 
time-travel stories must be fantasy. Indeed, some writers (Le Guin and Al- 
diss, for example) have conscientiously ruled it out of their serious SF. I 
would argue, however, that most time-travel stories are not science fantasy, 
and not simply because time travel is "probably impossible but difficult to 
disprove" (Benford: 83). A key text here is the most famous time-travel 
story of them all, Wells's The Time Machine, a "pure" example of SF. 
Niven argues that The Time Machine is SF because it uses only travel to the 
far future and thus avoids the paradoxes of time travel ("Theory and Prac- 
tice," p. 363), but more important are the facts that within the "grapholect" 
(Rabkin, Fantastic, pp. 20-21), or writing practice of Wells's time, such a 
machine did not so clearly violate contemporary scientific possibility and that 
Wells provided for his machine a (now unconvincing) scientific rationale. 
Once Wells had firmly embedded a time machine within an SF text, 
that gadget entered into the accumulating conventions of the genre where it 
could be appropriated and utilized by other SF writers. Any SF novum (like 
a time machine, FTL travel, and ESP) can become part of the repertoire of 
SF conventions and therefore a device or tool for other authors. It should be 
noted that conventionalized novums are indeed devices, that they serve as 
means to an end-namely, the introduction of the dominant or foregrounded 
novum in the fiction.8 In other words, the conventionalized novum has in 
fact lost its status as novum and now serves as a device subtending the 
"real" novum (as when an FTL drive is used to stage an alien encounter). In 
addition, as Scortia points out (pp. 138-39), time travel can be engineered 
in a "pure" SF novel when its scientific rationale accords with the realm of 
possibility. In Timescape (1980), for example, Gregory Benford bases time 
travel of a sort on the tachyon, a hypothetical faster-than-light particle not 
excluded by relativity theory. And the protagonists of Paul Anderson's Tau 
Zero (1970) travel in time to the end of the universe and beyond by virtue 
of the time-dilation effect that occurs at speeds close to the speed of light. 
In short, despite the fact that time travel would seem to be the kind of 
impossibility associated with fantasy, it can be a purely SF motif when it is 
used as an enabling convention or when it is inscribed in a naturalizing and 
scientific discourse. 
A science fantasy, then, must have as its dominant novum an entity or 
motif which explicitly violates standards of scientific possibility or empirical 
fact. There is a form of time-travel story which intrinsically violates reason, 
science, and common sense, and which therefore qualifies as science fantasy. 
I refer here to the "time-loop" story (see Lem's "Time Travel," pp. 75ff.), 
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in which an actant journeys via a time machine into his own past, meets up 
with himself at an earlier point in time, and supplies that former self with 
assistance based on future technologies or future events, thus solving the 
main conflict of the story. An extreme example is Heinlein's "All You 
Zombies," in which a traveller in time impregnates himself and gives birth 
to himself-the same actant is at once father, mother, and child. As Lem 
points out, time-loop stories frequently involve an act of creation ex nihilo 
and violate basic notions of cause-and-effect and before-and-after; these 
narrative structures are "internally contradictory in a causal sense" ("Time 
Travel," p. 76). Now although these stories can be read allegorically (for 
example, "All You Zombies" can be read as the literalization of philosophi- 
cal solipsism and thus as a parody of that notion), the time-loop story more 
frequently devolves into a kind of intellectual game in which the fictionist 
is free to play with logical contradiction and pseudo-logical hypotheses or 
to parody the conventions of SF itself. As Niven says ("Theory and Prac- 
tice," p. 366), this kind of story is a "form of fantasy superbly suited to 
games of logic." And these "games of logic" serve cognitive ends to the 
extent to which they call into question epistemological assumptions, empiri- 
cal givens, or literary conventions. 
Science, in its largest sense, consists not only in a set of natural laws 
and a set of procedures based on a certain epistemology, but also in a 
respect for empirical givens, in a faith in the inalterability of accepted fact. 
It follows that one can create science fantasy by deliberately reversing or 
denying a given historical fact.9 This is the case in "alternate history" sci- 
ence fantasies. In Pavane (1966) Keith Roberts imagines an alternate time- 
stream in which the Spanish Armada defeated the English fleet in 1588, 
resulting in a 1966 world dominated by a monolithic Catholic church. Tun- 
nel Through the Deeps by Harry Harrison (1972) is set in an alternate present 
in which the United States are still colonies of Great Britain because the 
Americans lost the Revolutionary War. The most celebrated of alternate 
present fictions is Dick's The Man in the High Castle (1962). Dick imag- 
ines a 1960s' US which lost World War II to the Axis powers and which 
has been partitioned (a' la East and West Germany) into two rival zones, the 
West Coast under the comparatively benign occupation of the Japanese, the 
East Coast under the brutal domination of pathological Germans. Alternate 
present worlds like these necessarily call into question received notions of 
history and progress and at the same time point out that cultural values are 
not absolute, that they are very much shaped by historical forces and events. 
They suggest the degree to which our view of things is a function of factors 
out of our control. Moreover, readers are encouraged to compare the alter- 
nate present with the actual present and see what the two worlds have in 
common. Dick's novel, for example, suggests that, like the characters in his 
counterfactual present, we live in a world in which "madmen are in power" 
(MHC 3:37), because those in power see themselves as agents, not victims, 
of history, because they believe they are godlike. An alternate present 
world then is science fantasy because it is created by extrapolation from a 
counterfactual postulate involving the reversal of a given historical fact. 
The extrapolated present of this "what if" world, though entirely imaginary, 
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nonetheless may address significant thematic concerns dealing with ques- 
tions of history, progress, values, and assumptions. 
If one way to create a science fantasy is to extrapolate from a reversal 
of historical fact, then a similar way would be to postulate a deviation from 
scientific fact and thus to envision a counterscientific world. The fictionist 
deliberately ignores the current state of scientific knowledge about a phe- 
nomenon in order to create a world that serves particular aesthetic ends. 
Frequently this contravention of scientific fact involves the planets of the 
Solar System, like Mars and Venus. C.S. Lewis, for example, admits that he 
put canals on Mars in his "Space Trilogy" despite the knowledge that such 
canals were an "optical delusion" ("On SF," p. 112). The stories in Brad- 
bury's The Martian Chronicles (1950) all take place on a Mars populated 
by the ghosts and artifacts of a noble race that never was nor ever could be. 
As Eric Rabkin points out, "by giving Mars a breathable atmosphere..., Ray 
Bradbury announces that his work is not to be taken entirely as science fic- 
tion-and held exclusively to that genre's aesthetic criteria-but rather is 
to be read at least in part as a kind of fairy tale set in a realm miraculously 
hospitable to humanity" ("The Rhetoric of Science in Fiction," p. 25). A 
deliberate contravention of this sort changes the generic identity of the fic- 
tion, moves it in the direction of fantasy, and calls forth from its reader 
slightly different reading protocols.l1 The inscription of counterscientific 
worlds, these impossibly hospitable planets sometimes serve no apparent 
cognitive ends; these fabulous worlds are their own justification. As Lewis 
says, "Nor need the strange worlds, when we get there, be at all strictly tied 
to scientific probabilities. It is their wonder or beauty or suggestiveness that 
matter[s]" ("On SF," pp. 11 1-12). 
A final form of science fantasy involves the introduction of a counter- 
natural entity into the system of actants, but, unlike in pure fantasy, in a 
world grounded in both scientific discourse and scientific necessity. An ac- 
tant is posited whose morphology, powers, or existence contravenes scien- 
tific possibility, but it appears in a world otherwise compatible with 
scientific necessity and inscribed in a scientific discourse. Robert Silver- 
berg's "Majipoor" trilogy (Lord Valentine's Castle [1981]; Majipoor 
Chronicles [1982]; Valentine Pontifex [1983]), for example, recounts the 
epic struggle for global power on a sprawling planet colonized and governed 
for many centuries by humans sometime in the distant future. Although 
these humans have forgotten much of the science bequeathed to them by an 
earlier "golden age," their home planet Majipoor obeys the basic dictates of 
an extrapolative or speculative SF world. The two native Majipoorian 
species, however, the protean Metamorphs and the telepathic giant sea 
dragons, are sets of counterscientific actants who "turn" the fiction toward 
science fantasy. Similarly, in Anne McCaffery's "Dragonrider" series, the 
reader encounters a fictional world which conflates SF and fantasy elements. 
The dragons of Pern have the ability to breathe fire and to fly, but both 
abilities are given scientific rationales. Even so, the image of fire-breathing 
dragons in flight certainly recalls traditional fantasy, an impression that is 
reinforced by the fact that the dragons possess other "magical" powers, like 
precognition, telepathy, race memory, and time-travel. These fantasy ele- 
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ments, however, are embedded in a discourse predicated upon the validity 
of the scientific method and scientific necessity. In hybridized science fan- 
tasies like these (and those by Bradley, Moorcock, Antony, and Wolfe), it 
is the tension between apparently contrastive elements-magic/science, 
supernatural/natural, mysticism/empiricism-that structures and informs 
the themes and the plot. These fictions demonstrate that "man is not satis- 
fied...with reason and science. He desires myth and magic, and if they do 
not exist, he will use science to create them" (Attebery: 241). 
We can imagine a spectrum of "hybridized worlds"-worlds whose 
actants and events combine scientific and fantasy elements-along which 
we can locate the above examples and other problematic cases. At the SF 
end, we would find Dune, a novel whose fantasy elements are systematically 
naturalized and accounted for. 1' At the other end, we would find those nov- 
els which approach pure fantasy, like Zelazny's "Amber" or Norton's 
"Witchworld" series. At this end we would also find the fictions of E.R. 
Burroughs, A. Merritt, and E.E. ("Doc") Smith, borderline science fantasies 
which rely on "unbridled, swashbuckling fantasy while retaining the termi- 
nology of science fiction" (Attebery: 237). Occupying the center of the 
spectrum would be a novel like Le Guin's Lathe of Heaven (1971), in 
which the protagonist discovers that his dreams have the power to change 
reality. This kind of power is extremely counterscientific (so much so that 
it cries out for metaphorical and metaliterary readings), but in the novel the 
scientist Haber goes to some lengths to account for it in scientific terms 
(see especially chapter 9). 
We can also locate the other forms of science fantasy along such a 
spectrum. At the SF end would be situated those alternate histories, like 
The Man in the High Castle, which entail the reversal of a single historical 
fact. Towards the fantasy end we would find the alternate histories like 
Randall Garrett's Lord Darcy stories of the Anglo-French empire (collected 
in Murder and Magic [1979] and Lord Darcy Investigates [1981]), in which 
the reversal of historical fact brings about an alternate present in which 
magic is the operative science. Lem's The Investigation would be near the 
center, on the SF side, whereas Lieber's Conjure Wife would be more 
towards the fantasy end. Even with such a spectrum there would be prob- 
lematic cases. I would argue, however, that the narrative discourse can, in 
most cases, determine where on the spectrum the work belongs. We must 
examine the way in which the work presents and accounts for its fantasy 
elements. If the discourse rigorously and systematically naturalizes those 
elements, then the work approaches SF; if it does not, then the work 
approaches fantasy. 
The last category-hybridized science fantasy-is certainly the "main- 
stream" of science fantasy and includes certain novels that have eluded 
typological definition. Sturgeon's More Than Human, for example, won 
the International Fantasy Award in 1954, but generally is treated as an SF 
novel of the "Golden Age." But SF "purists" have always been a little bit 
uncomfortable with the novel because of the way it brings together a group 
of urchins and strays with extraordinary, and counterscientific, psi-powers. 
If we recognize, however, that these children are really transformed fantasy 
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actants inserted into the prosaic and ordinary world of postwar America, 
then we see that Sturgeon was writing science fantasy, at a time when 
"hard" SF was generally the rule. 
Joanna Russ has said of fantasy that it "very often imitates the structure 
of the pastoral; one escapes from the familiar into the strange or fantastic 
only to return to the familiar at the end of the story" (p. 55). Science fantasy 
frequently appropriates the same structure. A representative of the world of 
science, of rationality and empiricism, journeys forth to encounter the 
world of fantasy, mysteries beyond science's purview, the kind of phenom- 
ena which A. Merritt prefigures in the opening paragraphs of The Metal 
Monster (1920): 
In this great crucible we call the world-in the vaster one we call the uni- 
verse-the mysteries lie close packed, unaccountable as the grains of sand on 
ocean's [sic] shores. They thread gigantic, the star-flung spaces; they creep, 
atomic, beneath the microscope's peering eye. They walk beside us, unseen 
and unheard, calling out to us, asking why we are deaf to their crying, blind to 
their wonder. 
Sometimes the veils drop from a man's eyes, and he sees-and speaks of 
his vision. (1: I 1) 
The central action of such novels involves a struggle between the world of 
science and that of fantasy, sometimes an armed conflict or physical agony 
but certainly a struggle to comprehend, to explain, to understand, for a 
belief in the possibility of understanding lies at the heart of the scientific 
enterprise: "All of [these mysteries] I was certain lay in the domain of the 
explicable, could be resolved into normality once the basic facts were 
gained" (Merritt 6:48). The protagonist may indeed be able to put some sort 
of scientific gloss upon the phenomena he witnesses, but he returns to the 
normal world chastened, more credulous, wiser: 
But to me-to each of us four who saw those phenomena-their lesson 
remains, ineradicable; giving new strength and purpose to us, teaching us a 
new humility. 
For in that vast crucible of life of which we are so small a part, what other 
shapes may even now be rising to submerge us? 
In that vast reservoir of force that is the mystery-filled infinite through 
which we roll, what other shadows may be speeding upon us? Who knows? 
(Merritt 31:203)12 
This encounter/return pattern is used in a number of science fantasies. In 
Merritt's The Metal Monster, botanist Walter Goodwin confronts the 
counternatural metal being and its quasi-human child Norhala in the remote 
regions of the Himalayas. In Elgin's Yonder Comes the Other End of Time 
(1986), Tri-Galactic Federation agent Coyote Jones, an advocate of 
"psience," meets and is defeated by the magical world of Ozark. In C.S. 
Lewis's Out of the Silent Planet (1938), Ransom, Devine, and Weston dis- 
cover that Sol's fourth planet is not Mars, a world to be exploited, but 
Malacandra, a world presided over by Oyarsa, a powerful spiritual being. 
In Lindsay's A Voyage to Arcturus (1920), the adventurer Maskull is drawn 
into a journey from drawing-room London to the protean and fabulous 
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planet of Tormance, a world tied into spiritual and metaphysical realities. 
In each case the scientific mentality or approach is shown to be limited and 
is put in its place. 
It is also interesting to note that many hybridized science-fantasy novels 
adhere to the traditional Romance archetype, perhaps because of the natural 
affinity between their respective worlds. For one thing, the fantasy actants 
of hybridized science fantasy presuppose a "world elsewhere," a marvelous 
or exotic topos in which one or more constraints of empirical reality or sci- 
entific necessity are suspended. In this world, the protagonist is endowed 
with certain counternatural powers or attributes, which give his or her 
adventures a larger-than-life quality. And those adventures frequently 
involve some sort of quest, either for a clearly defined object of desire or 
for the restoration of a shattered equilibrium. Most important, the recourse 
to fantasy allows the fictionist to stage the story in a universe invested with 
value, as opposed to the value-neutral universe of SF. C.S. Lewis depicts 
this movement from one universe to another when Ransom, aboard the 
spaceship, experiences the conversion of "Space" into "the heavens": 
But Ransom, as time wore on, became aware of another and more spiritual 
cause for his progressive lightening and exultation of heart. A nightmare, long 
engendered in the modem mind by the mythology that follows in the wake of 
science, was falling off him. He had read of 'Space': at the back of his think- 
ing for years had lurked the dismal fancy of the black, cold vacuity, the utter 
deadness, which was supposed to separate the worlds. He had not known how 
much it affected him till now-now that the very name 'Space' seemed a blas- 
phemous libel for this empyrean ocean of radiance in which they swam. He 
could not call it 'dead'; he felt life pouring into him from it every moment. 
How indeed should it be otherwise, since out of this ocean the worlds and all 
their life had come? He had thought it barren: he saw now that it was the 
womb of worlds,...No: Space was the wrong name. Older thinkers had been 
wiser when they named it simply the heavens. (Silent Planet 5:32) 
It is this conversion of "Space" into "the heavens" which signals the move- 
ment from SF to science fantasy, from a phenomenal universe to a noumenal 
one. Like fantasy, science fantasy is free to invest its actants and motifs 
with a power or a pattern that is lacking in the purely phenomenal world of 
the senses and the value-neutral universe of SF. One critic has noted that "at 
the core of all romance forms appears to be a Manichaean vision of the uni- 
verse as a struggle between good and bad magic" (Rose: 9).13 Fantasy, a 
subset of romance, frequently appropriates both the realm of magic and the 
Manichaean axis informing that realm. Indeed, Le Guin argues that "most 
great fantasies contain a very strong, striking moral dialectic, often expressed 
as a struggle between the Darkness and the Light" (Language of the Night, 
p. 65). One critic, in fact, suggests that this ethical or moral dimension is 
critical for fantasy, that the genre is based on a faith in some kind of super- 
natural moral order, an order which "is important not because it offers 
excitement and fun and escape, but because it provides laws and moral val- 
ues" (Wagoner: 26). Hybridized science fantasy frequently borrows from 
fantasy its ethical frameworks, its distinctions between good and bad 
magic. These distinctions are not always clear (one thinks here of Wolfe's 
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The Book of the New Sun [1982]),14 but they can be made. In such fictions, 
the outcome is seldom really in doubt; at the end, the goal is secured, the 
forces of evil defeated or thwarted, order restored. Because of their formal 
shapeliness (a function of the Romance archetype), their Manichaean ethical 
axis, and their adherence to "poetic justice," these fictions satisfy sublima- 
tive needs; they speak to our desires and dreams. As Gene Wolfe says, they 
achieve the "spirit of fantasy," revealing the "mystery of things" (pp. 22, 
23). 
The problematics of hybridized science-fantasy worlds reveal to some 
extent what an unstable, dynamic, and polymorphic form science fantasy is. 
Questions of historical context, the current state of knowledge, discursive 
strategies, and dominant features must all be taken into account in identify- 
ing this elusive (not to say illusive) subgenre. 
Why go to all that trouble? One might answer quite simply that it is 
important to be able to name a distinction which exists, that the possibility 
of making distinctions lies at the heart of genre theory. Or one might be 
more pragmatic than dogmatic, pointing out the use-value of such a distinc- 
tion. In terms of literary history, this distinction enables us to locate certain 
problematic literary texts, to identify Poe's The Narrative of Arthur Gordon 
Pym (1838) and Verne's Journey to the Center of the Earth (1864) as sci- 
ence fantasies within the contexts of their respective cultural grapholects. It 
also enables us to name certain trends in contemporary fantasy and science 
fiction-namely, the movement from SF to science fantasy by writers like 
Silverberg, Moorcock, Anthony, and others. But still the question might be 
asked, "What's in a name?" Granted that science fantasy is a valid and 
thriving narrative form, why go to some lengths to define and particularize 
it? Why? Because distinctions become very important when different narra- 
tive genres mobilize different reading protocols; so that to name a type is to 
know how to read. At least one critic argues that fantasy and SF are "natural 
enemies" in terms of reading strategies: 
Two kinds of art [fantasy and science fiction] instruct us to respond with two 
different parts of ourselves, the emotional and the rational, and each kind sees 
responding to the alien with the other side of the self to be counterproductive. 
And the status of objects in the two universes is correspondingly different. In 
'fantasy,' objects have primarily figurative status, whereas in 'science fiction,' 
the thing is a thing, a literal object. And again, each genre presents the alterna- 
tive as a fundamental error: in 'fantasy,' people have to be taught that the 
object is an externalization of their internal reality-it is, in short, a metaphor 
-whereas, in 'science fiction,' to see the object as a projection of the self is 
akin to madness. (Rawlins: 165) 
Several pages later, the critic summarizes as follows: "In fantasy, reason 
cuts us off from the instinctive wisdom of the irrational. In science fiction, 
reason liberates us from the narrowness of our humanity" (Rawlins: 168). 
The distinctions Rawlins is making between SF and fantasy as regards rea- 
son and emotion, intemal and external reality, literal and figurative status 
of objects, are too absolute and simplistic, but the notion that the genres 
call for different reading strategies is a good one. Fantasy deals with the 
unreal,'5 SF with the unknown; this basic difference naturally affects the 
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ways in which these genres are recuperated or naturalized. And science 
fantasy, located as it is at the intersection of these two genres, is uniquely 
situated to speak to both our heads and our hearts, to provide both cognitive 
and sublimative satisfactions. The fact that science fantasy is grounded in 
the discourse of scientific necessity and adheres to the scientific method 
guarantees that its worlds will have an internal consistency or logical expli- 
cability that is intellectually satisfying. But the contravention of natural law 
or empirical fact that defines the genre makes possible the introduction of 
actants, motifs, and topoi which play upon a wide range of human emotional 
needs while at the same time suspending the mimetic contract and its atten- 
dant responsibilities. C.S. Lewis argues that therein lies the fascination of 
science fantasy: 
The last sub-species of science fiction [by which he intends what we have 
termed science fantasy] represents imply an imaginative impulse as old as the 
human race working under the special conditions of our own time. It is not dif- 
ficult to see why those who wish to visit strange regions in search of such 
beauty, awe, or terror as the actual world does not supply have increasingly 
been driven to other planets or other stars. ("On SF," pp. 1 10-1 1) 
Like "magic realism," another narrative species enjoying a burgeoning 
interest, science fantasy is an oxymoronic form. In the counternatural 
worlds of science fantasy, the imaginary and the actual, the magical and the 
prosaic, the mythical and the scientific, meet and interanimate. In so doing, 
these worlds inspire us with new sensations and experiences, with "such 
beauty, awe, or terror as the actual world does not supply," with the stuff of 
desires, dreams, and dread. 
But perhaps the most important reason for identifying science fantasy 
is that because it mobilizes different reading protocols, it tends to circum- 
scribe an area of thematic concern differont from the thematics of either 
fantasy or SF. The cognitive dimensions of science fantasy are fuzzy and 
problematic, in part because the genre can take on very different forms and 
pose a wide variety of questions, in part because it approaches its thematic 
fields obliquely and in an exploratory way. But let me suggest the following 
general concems. By reversing natural law or empirical fact, science fantasy 
questions their absoluteness and givenness; by asserting the primacy of an 
invented and counternatural world, it questions the nature of reality; by tak- 
ing on the principles and conventions and facts which we take for granted, 
it tends to broach ultimate philosophical questions having to do with meta- 
physics, theology, cosmology, ontology, meta-theory (both scientific and 
literary), and mythopoeia. But most of all, because it stands poised between 
two opposing ways of conceiving the world, it addresses itself to the ques- 
tion of epistemology. As one critic says, 
the intrusion of the fantastic into what appears a science fiction text or a natu- 
ralistic text often simply alters the function of the fantastic material. Instead of 
being encouraged to think about questions of psychology and morality, the 
reader is being encouraged to consider matters of epistemology: how do we 
know what we think we know is accurate? It is the function of epistemology to 
relate any debate about the 'real' and the 'unreal' to the relationship between 
the known and the unknown. (Ketterer: 133) 
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In simplistic terms, SF deals with the known and the unknown, fantasy with 
the real and unreal. Science fantasy then mediates these two philosophical 
axes and explores their interrelationships. Itexplores the assumptions of SF 
by interrogating "science" in its broadest sense-i.e., systematic and 
methodical ways of apprehending, comprehending, and appropriating the 
physical world.16 It explores fantasy by calling into question the impossibil- 
ity and unreality of the spectral horrors and beautiful desires that haunt the 
value-laden worlds of our dreams. If "the real crux of the difference 
between fantasy and science fiction lies in the writer's attempt to present 
his ideas within the context of new assumptions about the way the world 
works" (Waggoner: 19), then the mixed genre of science fantasy is perfectly 
situated to interrogate those very assumptions. And it does. 
It may well be that within the scientific community those assumptions 
are in the midst of a radical change because of recent developments in sci- 
ence itself. Prigogine and Stengers argue, in Order Out of Chaos: Man's New 
Dialogue with Nature (1984), that a post-modem science is in the process 
of emerging, a science based on a new alliance between humanity and the 
world. The new alliance links humanity to a natural world reconceived as 
perpetually changing, incredibly diverse, inexhaustibly inventive, one "in 
which reversibility and randomness are the rules" (p. 8). The attempt of 
"modem science" to master the world, a world of fixed and immutable laws, 
has given way to a post-modem "re-enchantment of the world," in which 
humanity rediscovers a respect for nature's mystery. Because natural pro- 
cesses involve complex, rapidly evolving systems which are highly sensitive 
to the minutest fluctuations, the smallest changes can make a difference, 
and "individual activity is not doomed to insignificance" (p. 313). This 
leads Prigogine and Stengers to conclude that "we can no longer accept the 
old a priori distinction between scientific and ethical values" (p. 312). If 
they are right, then it seems probable that this redefinition of nature and our 
relation to it, this re-enchantment, will produce a cultural climate in which 
counterscientific forms like science fantasy will flourish. In the long run, of 
course, it may tum out that these narratives are no longer counterscientific, 
in which case we will have to resume the process of naming. 
NOTES 
1. Attempts to define science fantasy have been relatively few in number. The 
most substantial of them is Brian Attebery's contribution to the Dictionary of Lit- 
erary Biography. He sees science fantasy as a hybrid category composed of 
anomalous cases which don't quite fit into the "two well-defined genres, science 
fiction and fantasy" (p. 236). His definition proceeds by examining those anoma- 
lous cases. Gary Wolfe's entry in his SF&F glossary admits that the term is "rather 
imprecise," but refers to it as a genre "in which devices of fantasy are employed in 
a 'science fictional' context" (Critical Terms, p. 107). The science-fantasy author 
Gene Wolfe says that "a science fantasy story is one in which the means of science 
are used to achieve the spirit of fantasy" (p. 22). The definition closest to the one pre- 
sented in this essay is David Allen's: "Under this heading would go those stories 
which, assuming an orderly universe with regular and discoverable natural laws, 
propose that the natural laws are different from those we derive from our current 
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sciences" (p. 7). I have, in this essay, tried to build on these and other insights in a 
rigorous, systematic, and comprehensive way. 
2. Thomas D. Clareson gives the following example of what can happen when 
one locates the uniqueness of SF at the level of plot: "The protagonist, an alien 
creature, invades and struggles to survive amid a hostile society which dominates 
the planet-as in The Invisible Man by Ralph Ellison." As Clareson points out, 
"the same old story can be told in a number of ways" (pp. 2, 3). Darko Suvin, the 
foremost theoretician of SF, also locates the uniqueness of the genre in its world: 
SF "should be defined as a fictional tale determined by the hegemonic literary 
device of a locus and/or dramatis personae that.. .are radically or at least signifi- 
cantly different from the empirical times, places, and characters of 'mimetic' or 
'naturalist' fiction" (p. viii). It is SF's "representational discontinuity" (Scholes: 
62) which distinguishes the genre, gives it its generic stamp. This granted, it should 
be added that the invented world of an SF text necessarily interacts with its story, 
generating and channelling its complications, confrontations, and resolutions. The 
world has precedence, primacy, and priority; but once the world is postulated, an 
ongoing dynamic is set up between world and story. 
3. For an extended discussion of SF's worlds, see Malmgren, "Worlds Apart: 
A Theory of Science Fiction." 
4. Gary Wolfe argues that the "criterion of the impossible...may indeed be the 
first principle generally agreed upon for the study of fantasy" ("Encounter," pp. 1- 
2). Irwin defines fantasy as "a story based on and controlled by an overt violation 
of what is generally accepted as possibility; it is the narrative result of transforming 
the condition contrary to fact into 'fact' itself' (p. 4). Delany identifies the level of 
subjunctivity for fantasy as "could not have happened" ("About 5,175 Words," p. 
141). Russ elaborates on this notion as follows: "Fantasy...embodies a 'negative 
subjunctivity'-that is, fantasy is fantasy because it contravenes the real and vio- 
lates it....In Delany's words, fantasy is what could not have happened; i.e., what 
cannot happen, what cannot exist... .Fantasy violates the real, contravenes it, denies 
it, and insists on this denial throughout" (p. 52). 
5. The analysis which follows perhaps suggests a diachronic process; i.e., that 
first fantasy and SF existed as recognizable and distinct genres, and then someone 
came along and (deliberately?) combined features from each genre, creating a 
hybrid form. This is the way that Gene Wolfe defines the genre. I must emphasize 
that I am describing a synchronic system in which at a moment in time, science 
fantasy can be situated at a point of intersection between the two genres. The fact 
that fictions by Poe, Veme, E.R. Burroughs, and A. Merritt can best be identified 
as science fantasies attests to the genre's historical pedigree. 
6. Heinlein similarly tries to rationalize magic in two novellas of his, "Waldo" 
(1940) and "Magic, Inc." (1942). In "Waldo," see especially pp. 76ff. and 86ff. for 
Heinlein's attempt o "scientize" magic. 
7. Philmus points out that Sciss's statistical and "probabilistic approach" is, 
like Gregory's Holmesian approach, also presented as problematic in the novel, in 
part because "any number of variables might yield the sort of correlation he posits 
between the disappearances in Norfolk and the (low) incidence of cancer in that 
region" (p. 195). 
8. Cf. Attebery: "Such seemingly magical concepts as time-travel, telepathy, 
teleportation, precognition, and immortality are allowable [in SF] because they can 
be made to sound scientific. So many authors have proposed scientific rationales 
for such phenomena-warps in the space-time fabric, thought-wave amplifiers, 
anti-agathic drugs-that we now tend to accept them without second thought as a 
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valid part of scientific extrapolation. They are conventions, which like faster-than- 
light travel, open up the possibilities of the genre without seriously violating its 
rational basis" (p. 236). 
9. Cf. Amis: "science fiction...maintains a respect for fact or presumptive fact, 
fantasy makes a point of flouting these" (p. 22). 
10. Delany elaborates on the notion of reading protocols in "Generic Proto- 
cols: Science Fiction and Mundane." 
1. Dune is an interesting case in point. I would argue that it is situated on the 
border between SF and science fantasy. I would use as evidence here the training 
of the protagonist Paul Atreides, which combines the magical witchcraft of the 
Bene Gesserit with the mathematical wizardry of the Mentats; the nature, size, and 
powers of the sand worms; and the parapsychological powers attributed to the 
main actants (Paul, his sister, his mother, the Bene Gesserit, and the Space Guild). 
Although these powers are scientifically grounded, they are invested in the novel 
with a mystical or supernatural dimension that nudges the novel in the direction of 
science fantasy. In fact, the novel itself is built around sets of oppositions (science 
vs. religion, ecological science vs. mysticism) which may be loosely gathered 
within the science/fantasy polarity. It might be argued that Dune's popularity, 
which foreshadows that which science fantasy enjoys today, was a function of the 
way in which it balanced science and magic within an SF format. 
12. It is this anti-cognitive aspect of some science fantasy which is responsible 
for Suvin's attack upon it. Suvin calls it a "misshapen genre," which dispenses 
with plausibility capriciously and "rejects cognitive logic" (p. 68). Although 
Suvin's objections do obtain for some science fantasy (especially space opera), I 
hope to show that he underestimates or passes over the cognitive possibilities of 
science fantasy in general. 
13. SF, however, would be a Romance form rejecting such an ethical/noumenal 
framework. Suvin distinguishes between two value-oriented "estranged literary 
genres," namely "fantasy and folktale," both "anti-cognitive" forms: "their world is 
actively oriented toward the hero. The folktale...world is oriented positively toward 
its protagonist; a folktale is defined by the hero's triumph: magic weapons and 
helpers are, with the necessary narrative retardations, at his beck and call. Inversely, 
the fantasy world is oriented negatively toward its protagonist; a fantasy is defined 
by the hero's horrible helplessness....Thus in the folktale and the fantasy, ethics 
coincides with physics-positive (hero-furthering) in the first case, and [negative] 
(hero-denying) in the second" (p. 19). Most critics consider Suvin's "folktale" (the 
positively oriented world; cf. Tolkein's Ferie) a subset of fantasy. Like Suvin, 
Rosemary Jackson tends to belittle positively-oriented fantasies; she considers 
them conservative, reactionary, and regressive because "they go along with a 
desire to cease 'to be,' a longing to transcend the human" (p. 156). Unlike Suvin, 
however, she sees real value in negatively oriented fantasy, "post-Romantic fantasy 
(as opposed to faery)" (p. 81), a subversive literature of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
in which supernatural or demonic motifs have been internalized and partially natu- 
ralized. This "secular" fantasy interrogates the category of the "real" and blurs the 
boundaries between good and evil, "the easy polarization of good and evil which 
had operated in tales of supernaturalism and magic" (p. 56). Though modem fantasy 
may problematize the moral dialect, the categories of good and evil to some extent 
inhere in fantasy, defined as it is by the notions of unreality, supemature, and Oth- 
erness. Cf. Jameson: "Yet surely, in the shrinking world of the present day,...it 
ought to be less difficult to understand to what degree the concept of good and evil 
is a positional one that coincides with categories of Otherness" (pp. 114-15). 
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14. The Book of the New Sun is, in many ways, an exemplary and all-inclusive 
science fantasy. For one thing, it incorporates an exhaustive array of fantasy 
actants and motifs-a feudal, "sword and sorcery" setting upon a fallen "Urth" of 
the far-distant future, witches and sorcerers, ape-men, vampire bats, supernatural 
water behemoths, fire creatures, mysterious "cacogens," the resurrection of 
corpses, mirrors that teleport creatures, and a magical jewel that heals and protects. 
But these phenomena are all, sooner or later, given a scientific gloss or an S-F 
explanation (the "cacogens," for example, tum out to be beneficent, but misunder- 
stood, extraterrestrials). And yet, despite the interpolated glosses and the scientific 
terminology, there remains a fantasy/supernatural increment that is unaccounted 
for, an aura of mystery, an element of the "uncanny" (the protagonist's word). The 
tetralogy parades the basic themes of science fantasy-religion vs. science and 
their common basis in faith; the natural and the supernatural; the mystery beneath 
the commonplace; the danger of two-value systems; the relation of imagination 
and reality; the problematic grounds of knowledge-but it mediates its many 
polarities without resolving them, leaving certain mysteries intact and enigmas 
unsolved. The Book of the New Sun merits close and rigorous study, which I will 
undertake lsewhere. 
15. Cf. Jackson: "[Fantasy's] introduction of the 'unreal' is set against the cat- 
egory of the 'real'-a category which the fantastic interrogates by its difference" 
(p. 4); and "[fantasy] enters a dialogue with the 'real' and incorporates that dia- 
logue as part of its essential structure" (p. 36; itals. in original). 
16. For a playful examination of the scientific method, see Stanley Schmidt's 
science fantasy, Newton and the Quasi-Apple (1975). 
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RESUME 
Carl Malmgren. Vers une deifnition de la fantaisie scientiflque.-La science-fic- 
tion et lafantaisie ont un lieu de rencontre, lafantaisie scientifique. II s'agit d'une 
forme narrative instable qui combine des caracte'ristiques des deux genres. Les 
personnages, ou les de'cors ou les e've'nements du monde de lafantaisie scientifique 
comportent au moins une violation evidente d'une loi de la nature ou d'une con- 
trainte scientifique tout en fournissant clairement une explicaiton structuree ou 
scientifique de cette meme violation et en basant son discours sur une episte'me' sci- 
entifique. La fantaisie scientifique, comme la science-fiction, pre'sente un univers 
ordonne' dote de lois communes, mais tout comme la fantaisie, elle contient au 
moins une inversion explicite d'une loi naturelle admise. Nous pouvons e'tablir les 
frontieres et les pre'occupations thematiques de cette forme narrative en examinant 
deux re'cits de science fantaisie: 1'e'crit de Fritz Leiber, Conjure Wife (1953) et 
celui de Stanislaw Lem, The Investigation. C' est a partir de 1'essence de la viola- 
tion de la loi naturelle que nous pouvons distinguer diffirrents types de science fan- 
taisie. Les quatres types impliquent: la boucle du temps; les mondes successifs au 
present; le monde anti-scientifique t le monde hybride'. En tant que sous-genre, la 
fantaisie scientifique interroge la science en doutant des connaissances scien- 
tifiques de base concernant le monde re'el. Par la me^me occasion, elle scrute la 
fantaisie en interrogeant l'illusion des terreurs et des de'sirs qui hantent le monde 
onirique si riche en valeurs. La fantaisie scientifique est de plus en plus populaire, 
tout comme le <<re'alisme magique>> auquel elle s'apparente par certains cot s. 
Cette popularite' s'explique car, d'une certaine fa~on, dans ces mondes contre 
nature, le re'el et l'imaginaire, le prosaique et le magique, le scientifique et le 
mythique peuvent se rencontrer et s'influencer et egalement parce qlue ces mondes 
nous procurent *<une telle beaute', une telle surprise ou une telle terreur absentes 
du monde re'el>> (C.S. Lewis). (CM) 
Abstract.-SF and fantasy have a locus of intersection, science fantasy. an unstable 
narrative form which combines features from each genre. A science-fantasy world 
is one in which the characters or settings or events presuppose at least one clear 
violation of natural law or scientific necessity, but which explicitly provides an 
organized or scientific explanation for that violation and which grounds its dis- 
course in a scientific episteme. Science fantasy, like SF, assumes an orderly uni- 
verse with regular laws, but, like fantasy, contains at least one explicit reversal of 
current natural law. An examination of two science-fantasy texts, Fritz Leiber's 
Conjure Wife (1953) and Stanislaw Lem's The Investigation (1959), enables us to 
establish the boundaries and thematic concerns of this narrative form. The types of 
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science fantasy can be identified by the nature of the violation of natural law. Four 
main types involve the time-loop motif, the alternate-present world, the countersci- 
entific world, and the hybridized world. As a subgenre, science fantasy tends to 
interrogate science by calling into question basic scientific assumptions about the 
physical world. At the same time it explores fantasy by questioning the unreality of 
the terrors and desires that haunt the value-laden world of dreams. Like "magic 
realism," with which it shares some features, science fantasy is experiencing a 
growing popularity, in part because in its counternatural worlds, the actual and 
the imaginary, the prosaic and the magical, the scientific and the mythical, can 
meet and interanimate, in part because these worlds provide us with "such beauty, 
awe, or terror as the actual world does not supply" (C.S. Lewis). (CM) 
